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CLEARING THE PATH FOR AN ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE
The defense of entrapment, one of several affirmative defenses
upon which a criminally accused can presently rely to assert his in-
nocence, was not recognized at the common law.1 Prior to 1932 the
concept of the defense of avoidance centered around the idea of
"mducement."2 It was not until Sorrells v. United States3 that the
United States Supreme Court established a theory for the modem
defense of entrapment. In Sorrells the defendant was repeatedly asked
by a government agent to purchase a quantity of liquor in violation of
Amendment XVIII of the Constitution. The defendant was found
guilty of the illicit purchase and his conviction was affirmed by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.4 The case
reached the Supreme Court upon writ of certiorari and subsequently
the grounds for a valid entrapment defense were promulgated. 5 At the
close of his opinion Mr. Chief Justice Hughes pointed out that the
government, in its brief, assumed that in utilizing the defense of entrap-
ment the accused was not denying his guilt, but was alleging special
facts upon which he could rely regardless of his guilt or innocence
of the crime charged. This, the Court noted, was a misconception. The
defense of entrapment is available to preclude the government from
contending that the defendant is guilty of a crime where government
officials have been the instigators of the accused's conduct." The
position of the federal courts, then, is that in such circumstances the
defendant is not guilty.
Since the Sorrells decision entrapment has come to be defined as
"[t]he act of officers or agents of the government in inducing a person
to commit a crime not contemplated by him, for the purpose of
instituting a criminal prosecution against him."7 Although the defense,
accepted as defined, is available in most state courts and is firmly
established in the federal courts,8 it enjoys no judicially affirmed con-
stitutional basis.9 In both Sorrells and Sherman v. United States10 the
Supreme Court ruled that the defense of entrapment was based on the
fact that Congress, in the statutes involved, did not intend to punish
1 State v. Good, 165 N.E.2d 28, 38 (Ohio 1960); see 21 AM. Jun. 2d
Criminal Law § 143 (1965).
2 Woo Wai v. United States, 223 F. 412, 415 (9th Cir. 1915).
3287 U.S. 435 (1932).
4 Sorrells v. United States, 57 F.2d 973 (4th Cir. 1932).
5 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
6 Id. at 452.
7 BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 627 (4th ed. 1968).
8 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
0 Orfield, The Defense of Entrapment in the Federal Courts, 1967 Dra= L.J.
39, 53.
10 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
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entrapped defendants. The concurring Justices in these cases expressed
the view that regardless of Congressional intent, the courts, as a
matter of public policy which does not countenance such impermissible
police conduct, could not convict entrapped defendants." It is not
necessarily true, therefore, that an entrapment defense could not be
omitted in a criminal prosecution under state law.
Beyond the general questions of what is the basis for the defense
of entrapment and what factors must be present to invoke the defense,
there lies a more specific issue which recently was raised in United
States v. Shameia:12 Can an accused raise the defense of entrapment
without admitting commission of the alleged crime? This question is
hardly a new one. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals alluded to the
issue as long ago as 1925-prior to any definitive formulation of a
schema of the entrapment defense- in Scriber v. United States.'3
The majority noted in Scriber that, in deciding on the utilization of
any type of avoidance defense, the defendant might enjoy the benefit
of that defense despite the existence of an apparent inconsistency.
Since the Scriber decision, the Sixth Circuit has been unpredictable
in its holdings on this issue. For example, in United States v. Baker'
4
Judge Edwards expressed the opinion that the apparent inconsistency
between an accused's defenses of denying the commission of the crime
and also assuming the position that any of his actions, if criminal,
occurred as a result of entrapment, does not necessarily preclude
submission of both defenses to the jury.15 In Shameia the defendant,
a grocery store owner and operator, was convicted of violating the
Food Stamp Act.' 6 Evidence introduced by the prosecution revealed
that government agents went to the defendant's store on several
occasions and received nonfood items or cash in exchange for food
stamps in violation of the Act. The defendant denied any transactions
with government agents and at the close of evidence submitted to the
court proposed instructions on entrapment. The trial court refused
to charge the jury in accordance with the defendant's instructions.
On appeal the Sixth Circuit held that if a defendant denies commis-
sion of the alleged crime he is precluded from asserting the defense of
entrapment.
31 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 378 (1958) (Frankfurter, Bren-
nan, Douglas & Harlan JJ., concurring); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435
(1932) (Roberts, Brandeis & Stone, JJ., concurring); see Comment, 1964 ILL. L.F.
821.
12 464 F.2d 629 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. - (1972).
134 F.2d 97, 98 (6th Cir. 1925).
14 373 F.2d 28 (6th Cir. 1967).
1 Id. at 30.10 7 U.S.C. § 2011 (1970).
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The Shameia decision serves to exemplify one aspect of the incon-
sistency among the circuits of the United States Courts of Appeal on
this question.' 7 Basically, three positions have been assumed by the
courts. The first is clearly stated in Ortega v. United States:' "To
utilize the entrapment defense, an accused must admit he committed
acts which constitute a crime. . . ."19 The second position finds no
inconsistency where an accused denies commission of the alleged
crimes but nevertheless urges that any acts which he did commit were
induced by law enforcement officials. 20 Finally, a number of decisions
have been rendered which permit assertion of the entrapment defense
where evidence of entrapment is introduced by the testimony of gov-
erinent witnesses, notwithstanding a denial of commission of the
crime by the accused 21
Any attempt to rectify this inconsistency within the federal court
system must look to the rationale behind the entrapment defense.
Justice Frankfurter stated the reasoning well in Sherman v. United
States22 where he noted that the fundamental public policy underlying
the defense of entrapment is the protection of "public confidence in
the fair and honorable administration of justice" which may well be
threatened if the courts permit "enforcement of the law by lawless
means."23 In order to mitigate the effect of unlawful police practice,
therefore, an accused is permitted to choose as his shield the defense
of entrapment.2 4 Overlooking the issue of alternative defenses for
17 See United States v. Johnson, 426 F.2d 112 (7th Cir. 1970); Harris v.
United States, 400 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1968); Martinez v. United States, 373 F.2d
810 (10th Cir. 1967); Ortega v. United States, 348 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1965)-
Sylvia v. United States, 312 F.2d 145 (1st Cir. 1963). But see Rider v. United
States, 391 F.2d 260 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1040 (1968); United States
v. Ramsey, 374 F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1967); United States v. Alford, 373 F.2d 508
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 937 (1967); Notaro v. United States, 363 F.2d
169 (9th Cir. 1966); Sears v. United States, 343 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1965);
Redfield v. United States, 328 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 972
(1964); Gorin v. United States, 313 F.2d 641 (1st Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 971 (1964); Hansford v. United States, 303 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1962);
Crisp v. United States, 262 F.2d 320 (4th Cir. 1954).
18 348 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1965).
19 Id. at 876.
20 See Rider v. United States, 391 F.2d 260 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1040 (1968); Hansford v. United States, 303 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Crisp v.
United States, 262 F.2d 320 (4th Cir. 1954); People v. Perez, 62 Cal.2d 769, 401
P.2d 934 (1965); 70 HA~v. L. REv. 1302, 1303 (1957).
21 See United States v. Ramsey, 374 F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1967); Notaro v.
United States, 363 F.2d 169 (9th Cir. 1966); Sears v. United States, 343 F.2d
139 (5th Cir. 1965); Corin v. United States, 313 F.2d 641, n.10 (1st Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 971 (1964).
22356 U.S. 369 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
23d at 380.
24 Cf. People v. Perez, 62 Cal.2d 769, 401 P.2d 934, 938 (1965), where Chief
justice Traynor observes that entrapment is recognized as a defense of the public
(Continued on next page)
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the moment, on whom does the burden of proof rest once the entrap-
ment defense has been chosen? In State v. Good 5 the majority states:
"[e]ntrapment is an affirmative or positive defense, and one that the
defendant must prove."26 The federal courts, however, seem to take
a different view. In Notaro v. United States27 the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit noted that when the entrapment issue has arisen
and the appropriate instruction has been submitted to the jury, it
should not be phrased in terms of any burden whatsoever on the
defendant. It is the prosecutor's burden to establish guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt and this must be accomplished by proving that the
defendant was not wrongfully entrapped. 28
The Ninth Circuit rationale thus leaves the burden of proof with
the prosecution, but does it leave the defendant in an equitable posi-
tion if he has been compelled to choose between defenses? When
the entrapment defense has been relied upon at the cost of foregoing
all denials of commission of the alleged crime, the burden of proof
on the government has surely been mitigated; it is no longer necessary
for the prosecution to prove commission of the crime at all. The
burden which remains vith the prosecution is undoubtedly alleviated
since evidence of the defendant's predisposition, which can include
criminal convictions, prior criminal activity notwithstanding conviction
and general character evidence, can be introduced as proof. 29 Com-
pelled to make this choice, the accused is placed in a precarious
situation.
As mentioned earlier the defense of entrapment has not been estab-
lished on an affirmative constitutional basis.30 Despite this shortcom-
ing, when an accused is compelled to choose between denial of
commission of a crime and reliance upon the entrapment defense, he
is confronted with a choice between two judically affirmed rights.3 '
The United States Supreme Court considered a somewhat analagous
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
against unlawful police schemes or actions, which are designed to promote rather
than prevent crime. He asks how a rule designed to deter any such unlawful
conduct could fairly be limited by compelling a defendant to incriminate himself
as a condition precedent to invoking that rule. Such compulsion of incrimination
and admission, he contends, would result in the defendant's relieving the prosecu-
tion of its burden of proving his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and at the same
time risking not being able to meet his own burden of establishing entrapment.
25 165 N.E.2d 28 (Ohio 1960).
26 Id. at 38.
27 363 F.2d 169 (9th Cir. 1966).
28 Id. at 175.
2 Orfield, supra note 9, at 59-61.
30 Id. at 53.
31 See Comment, 56 IowA L. REv. 686, 690 (1971), for a discussion of the
significance of this same choice if it is presumed that the defense of entrapment
finds its roots in the Constitution.
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situation in Simmons v. United States,32 a case which involved the
compulsion of a defendant to choose between his fifth amendment
right against self-incrimination and his fourth amendment right against
unreasonable search and seizure. In holding that self-incriminating
testimony given to establish standing in support of a motion to sup-
press evidence on fourth amendment grounds could not be admitted
against the defendant at trial on the issue of guilt, the Court pointed
out that this involved a choice between two constitutionally protected
rights. There appears to be no logical reason why this rationale should
not extend to the situation where one judicially recognized defense
must be capitulated in order to assert another.33
Besides being deprived of the protection against a mandatory
choice of defenses as awarded in Simmons, because the right to an en-
trapment defense is not founded on a constitutional guarantee, the
fate of an accused who attempts to invoke the defense of entrapment
might well depend upon the judicial circuit in which the alleged
unlawful act was committed. The three aforementioned positions
which have been taken on this issue of the availability of alternative
defenses are expressed in decisions of the various circuits. Both the
Tenth Circuit and the Seventh Circuit have consistently held that
the defense of entrapment cannot be applied to a particular case
unless commission of the crime charged is admitted by the accused. 34
The decisions of the Ninth Circuit unfailingly assume a like position
with the exception of Notaro v. United States,25 in which the majority
implies that where evidence of entrapment is introduced by the
testimony of government witnesses, a defendant might utilize the en-
trapment defense despite his denial of the unlawful activity.36
The only circuit which-given the opportunity-has failed to rule
out the basic right of a defendant to submit to a jury the alternative
defenses of denial and entrapment is the Fourth.37 On several oc-
casions the Fifth Circuit has ruled that a defendant must choose
between denying wrongful acts and invoking an entrapment defense.3 8
However, there are notable ambiguities and inconsistencies among
32390 U.S. 377 (1968).
33 See 56 IowA L. REv., supra note 31, at 691.
34 See United States v. Gibson, 446 F.2d 719 (10th Gir. 1971); United States
v. Johnston, 426 F.2d 112 (7th Cir. 1970); Munroe v. United States, 424 F.2d. 243
(10th Cir. 1970); Rowlette v. United States, 392 F.2d 437 (10th Cir. 1968);
United States v. Roviaro, 379 F.2d 911 (7th Cir. 1967); Martinez v. United States,
373 F.2d 810 (10th Cir. 1967).
35 363 F.2d 169, 174 (9th Cir. 1966) (dictum).
36 Id. at 175.
37 Crisp v. United States, 262 F.2d 320 (4th Cir. 1954) (dictum).
38 See Harris v. United States, 400 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1968); McCarty v.
United States, 379 F.2d 285 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 929 (1967); Rod-
riguez v. United States, 227 F.2d 912 (5th Gir. 1955).
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various decisions of the Fifth Circuit.39 This is especially evident in
Sears v. United States40 where the court notes that if the government
injects evidence of entrapment into a trial, the defendant is entitled
to an instruction that if the jury finds that he committed the alleged
acts, it must further consider whether he was entrapped into com-
mitting them.
41
The decisions of both the First and the Second Circuits also lack
finality on the question of these alternative defenses of denial and
entrapment.42 In United States v. Alford43 the majority indicated that
if the trial court is to consider whether a defendant has a right not
only to deny the alleged offense but also to rely on the defense of
entrapment, the evidence must merely be of a nature which would
have entitled the accused to a charge on entrapment were it not for
his denial.44 It is also interesting to note that in this same case the
court admitted that a final decision has not been made on the issue of
the alternative defenses. 45
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia established in
Hansford v. United States40 that it was possible-and consistent with
the defendant's denial of the alleged transaction in this case-for the
accused to argue that if the jury believed that the unlawful transaction
did occur, the prosecution's evidence as to how it occurred could
indicate entrapment and require an equivalent instruction.47 This
position was either modified or reversed two years later when the
same court noted that where a defendant's evidence fails to establish
the defense of entrapment, he is not entitled to submission to the jury
of an entrapment instruction.48
Keeping in mind the diverse positions of the Circuit Courts of
39 See Rider v. United States, 391 F.2d 260 (5th Cir. 1968), where the court
approved a district court instruction that an accused is entitled to any and all
defenses he might desire, regardless of their consistency, and Siglar v. United States,
208 F.2d 865 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 991 (1954), where the court
implied that if the issue of entrapment was raised by the defendant himself or
through the testimony of witnesses, the defense might be entitled to an instruction
on that issue.
40 343 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1965).
41 Id. at 143. The court adds that what might be a valid defense should
niot be forfeited by an accused nor should improper conduct of law enforcement
officers be ignored by the court merely because the defendant elected to put the
government to its proof.
42 See United States v. Ramsey, 374 F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1967); United States
v. Alford, 373 F.2d 508 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 937 (1967); Corin v.
United States, 313 F.2d 641 (1st Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 971 (1964).
43 373 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1967).
44 Id. at 509.
45 Id
46303 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
47 Id. at 221.
48 Redfield v. United States, 328 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
972 (1964).
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Appeals, and remembering that in many situations an accussed is
compelled to choose between two judicially recognized and affirmed
defenses, the question of what can be done to clear the path for the
equitable vindication of a defendant's rights inevitably arises. The
Supreme Court consistently has declined to rule on the issue of
whether an accused can deny the commission of a crime and yet
retain the right to have an entrapment instruction submitted to the
jury.49 It appears that in Shameia the Sixth Circuit majority merely
counted decisions and concluded that there was a greater number of
cases which denied the alternative defenses than which permitted the
practice. Regardless of what approach was used in reaching the
Shameia holding, it seems clear that the issue awaits resolution. Several
commentators have made suggestions, 0 but the question remains.
CONCLUSION
By refusing to grant a writ of certiorari in Shameia, the United
States Supreme Court has implied that the inconsistencies among the
holdings of the Circuit Courts of Appeals are not so formidable as to
threaten the rights of criminal defendants. As the situation now exists,
however, an individual's right to liberty is jeopardized in a circuit
where the right to alternative jury instructions on the defenses of
denial and entrapment is prohibited. The fact that a defendant is
compelled irrevocably to choose one defense at the cost of relinquishing
another only in certain circuits borders on denial of both equal
protection and due process as guaranteed by the Constitution.
The power to rectify the inequities discussed rests with the United
States Supreme Court. In this era of concern over law and order it is
quite possible that governmental agents can become overzealous in
performing their law enforcement duties. When evidence of such
action is brought out during the course of a criminal proceeding, there
seems to be no cogent reason why the jury should not be instructed
49 See United States v. Shameia, 464 F.2d 629 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, -
U.S. - (1972); United States v. Alford, 373 F.2d 508 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
387 U.S. 937 (1967); Gorin v. United States, 313 F.2d 641 (1st Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 971 (1964); Siglar v. United States, 208 F.2d 865 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 347 U.S. 991 (1954).
50 See Orfield, supra note 9, at 65, in which the author posits that the Shameia
rule is a receding one and in need of change; Note, The Serpent Beguiled Me and
I Did Eat-The Constitutional Status of the Entrapment Defense, 74 YAI.E L.J.
942, 950 (1965), which draws an analogy between entrapment and coerced con-
fessions and points out that the basic objectives of interrogation and solicitation
are similar, i.e., to induce the accused to supply evidence of his guilt; 56 IowA L.
REv., supra note 31, which indicates the factors which make a change from the
Shameia rule imperative.
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by the court that the question of entrapment may be considered even
though the defendant has denied commission of the crime. Such a
uniform practice, which adds to the discretion of the trial court by
allowing the judge to decide whether the issue of entrapment has been
raised by the evidence, would eradicate the present inconsistencies
among the circuits and contribute to clearing the path for an effective
entrapment defense.
Paul V. Hibberd
